Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September-October 2008, page 61
Waging Peace
MEPC Capitol Hill Panel Discusses War with Iran
“DIPLOMACY” was the word of the day on June 20, as the Middle East Policy Council (MEPC) hosted a panel in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building to address the possibility, and potential repercussions, of U.S. military action against Iran.
Dr. John Duke Anthony, founding president and CEO of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, opened the discussion by encouraging the engagement of Iran “in every possible, imaginable way.” The downside of diplomacy, noted Dr. Anthony, is that it is often invisible, designed to prevent things from happening that one cannot prove would have happened otherwise. Diplomacy has not been exhausted, he pointed out, and must be pursued further.
Wayne White, former deputy director of the State Department’s Near East and South Asia Office, argued that there is another option between war and failed diplomacy: doing nothing. He characterized as “absolute insanity” the idea that Iran would carry out a nuclear strike against Israel—the concern, he said, “which is really what’s driving all this.”
While there is an obvious concern about a “proliferation domino effect,” White acknowledged, he believes that Iran’s desire to “go nuclear” is based primarily on the deterrent power of a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, strikes against nuclear targets may not dispel that desire, but rather force it underground. MEPC president Ambassador Chas Freeman paraphrased White’s argument: “If you can’t solve the problem, manage it.”
During the panel’s “Regional Reactions” segment, Professor Jean-Francois Seznec of Georgetown University noted that “actively doing nothing” is how he perceives Saudi Arabia’s point of view. Since the Saudis wish to become the region’s “economic hegemon,” and are aware that a U.S. attack on Iran would likely limit their ability for economic growth, he explained, the Kingdom is seeking to gain time to simultaneously maximize its wealth while waiting for Iran to collapse financially.
Discussion of the regional implications of a potential war then turned to Iraq. Ambassador Freeman identified two American concerns with Iran: curtailing Iranian nuclear ambitions and protecting U.S. forces in Iraq. These, however, may be at odds, White argued: it is possible that Iran would retaliate to a military attack on its facilities by increasing its support for opposition forces in Iraq or, as an absolute worst case scenario, sending Revolutionary Guard units across the border to attack U.S. forces.
On another level, the use of Iraqi bases or airspace to launch an attack on Iran would bring to the fore the sensitive question of Iraqi sovereignty, and jeopardize the Maliki government’s desire to maintain friendly relations with Tehran.
This, then, is in conflict with a lesson we should be learning from Iraq, concluded Ambassador Freeman: that we ought to be hesitant to say that a country is a threat to other countries in the region, when the other countries do not agree.
—Kay Argyll |