August 2005 Postcard
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The “Downing Street Memo” documents high-level discussions between 10 Downing Street and the White House that clearly indicate that, as far as eight months before the war on Iraq—before the U.N. inspectors had finished their job, and before the president asked for congressional authorization—the two governments were making large-scale military plans and knowingly conspiring to manipulate evidence and international bodies to justify their actions.
Congressman John Conyers of Michigan, with the support of 122 members of Congress and over 560,000 U.S. citizens, are demanding answers. I urge you to join them.
This is not a partisan issue. Democrats and Republicans alike should be outraged that their president lied to the American people about a war that was not necessary and has resulted in the death of 1,800 Americans and 100,000 Iraqis. Americans and the world have the right to know why. ❑
City, State, Zip:
Four months after the March 20, 2003 invasion of Iraq President George W. Bush (r) and Prime Minister Tony Blair, at a joint White House press conference on July 17, 2003, attempted to deflect criticism on bad intelligence leading up to the war. According to the Downing Street memo, the intelligence was not bad, but “fixed” (Tim Sloan/AFP Photo).
Excerpts from “The Downing Street Memo,” the internal minutes of the July 23, 2002 meeting of the British Cabinet:
“It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.…
“C [Sir Richard Dearlove, Head of MI6] reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.…There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.”