Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June/July 2019, p. 65
Book Talks
By Craig Sanders
On April 24, Ervand Abrahamian, a distinguished Professor at CUNY's Baruch College, gave a presentation on modern Iranian history at the University of Denver as part of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies’ semester-long lecture series on “The Iranian Revolution: 40 Years Later, 1979-2019.”
Abrahamian argued that analysis of the 1979 Islamic Revolution tends to overlook the significance of the 1953 coup, in which the U.S. and UK orchestrated the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, in favor of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In both academic and diplomatic circles, the 1979 revolution came as a surprise, he noted, as the shah had a large army, sizeable bureaucracy, ample secret police and significant amounts of money. “Most revolutions are pretty unexpected, but this one I think was more unexpected because people saw the regime as a very solid, very viable regime,” he said. However, once the revolution began, the shah’s government “collapsed like a pack of cards” and fell in a matter of 17 months.
In the decades since, most researchers have focused on the short-term triggers that led to the revolution, but Abrahamian contended, short-term triggers alone don’t provoke revolutions—something more foundational is needed. There were notable short-term triggers surrounding the revolution, such as increased pressure from the U.S. to improve human rights and instability in the oil markets. However, all these short-term events do not explain why the shah’s regime fell so quickly. The shah collapsed because he lacked legitimacy in the eyes of his people, stemming from his role in the 1953 coup, Abrahamian said.
When Mosaddegh nationalized Iranian oil in 1951, the U.S. and UK wanted the shah to veto the decision. However, the shah refused, knowing nationalization was wildly popular among Iranians and that going against Mosaddegh’s decision would be political suicide. The CIA eventually forced his hands, telling the shah he had a decision to make: support the re-privatization of the country’s oil or also be taken down in the coup. While he was essentially blackmailed into supporting the coup, Iranians never forgave the shah. “The 1953 coup in Iran, you can call it the original sin of the shah,” Abrahamian said. “From then on he was seen as someone who was no longer really representing Iran. He had helped overthrow the symbol of Iranian independence and nationalism, and created a new, basically puppet state of the United States.”
Lacking credibility, the shah attempted to manufacture sources of legitimacy throughout his reign. He sought to portray himself as being a major player in the oil market, even though in reality he had little say over prices, since he denationalized the country’s oil. He also sought to draw connections between his rule and the 2,500-year history of monarchy in Iran, but, Abrahamian explained, this failed to gain gravitas among the population, as his rule had no connection to past dynasties. The shah also built-up the military and became “Nixon’s policeman in the Middle East” in an effort to show strength. However this too backfired, as he was viewed as a puppet of the U.S.
Asked about the similarities and differences between the crises of legitimacy then and now, Abrahamian said that the 1979 revolution was widely popular, so the origins still hold a good amount of legitimacy with the people. Additionally, the 1980s war with Iraq gave the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a great deal of legitimacy and strength that has carried on until today. Although the shah had a large army that was trained by the U.S., it was very unreliable, especially in stifling public discontent, and thus was weaker than the forces that govern Iran today.
The event ended on a final question—what is his prediction for the future? Reform or change? Abrahamian said that much depends on outside forces. Iran is only a player in the drama, while “the major guerilla in the room is the United States.” The Iranian constitution is flexible enough to permit change and allow referendums that could bring about reform, while still keeping the roots of the country grounded in the Islamic Revolution.
Abrahamian’s newly revised book, A History of Modern Iran, was released last year and is available from Middle East Books and More.
