Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2016, pp. 70

Book Reviews

Congress and the Shaping of the Middle East

By Dr. Kirk J. Beattie, Seven Stories Press, 2015, ­hardcover, 320 pp. List: $30; MEB: $24.

Reviewed by Andrew I. Killgore

Dr. Kirk Beattie of Boston’s Simmons College spent nearly a decade on his book Congress and the Shaping of the Middle East, described as “stunning” by Harvard professor Stephen Walt. During the 2005-6 and 2010-11 academic years Beattie interviewed hundreds of congressional staffers and Middle East-centered groups—including this magazine’s executive editor Richard H. Curtiss, managing editor Janet McMahon and this writer. Nobody else has dug into the very essence of Congress to show how it shapes the Middle East.

The book opens with a question: Is Congress broken? and ends with Beattie’s answer: Yes, it’s broken, impacted by “special interests.” Beattie lists issues with which Congress has trouble, such as healthcare, the economic crisis and gun control. But on the Arab-Israeli issue, Beattie writes, “Most Americans are inclined to see a high degree of confluence between American and Israeli interests. This is the message they are fed by most American and Israeli political figures.”

The author’s original aim was to study the Israel-Palestine question, but he ended up looking at all questions affected by that conflict.

In between Beattie’s opening question and final conclusion are chapters on: The Costs of Getting Elected; Getting Elected to Congress; House/Senate Staffers on the Job; Explaining Congresspersons’ Behavior on Mideast Affairs; How House Members/Senators Make Mideast Policy; and Appropriations.

Beattie writes that congresspersons are heavily dependent on their staffs. At the lower end staff members don’t stay in their positions long because they are overworked and underpaid. When they do quit, they often end up working for a lobbying firm with better pay.

Beattie found that most congresspersons know little about the Middle East and care not a lot. That being the case, they generally take a position recommended by lobbyists, especially from the omnipresent American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

Beattie learned that AIPAC interviewed every congressperson to determine their views, to find out about their plans, and to make clear what AIPAC expected of them. AIPAC’s power was clear: $67 million to $70 million annual budget, 200 people on staff, and a (claimed) membership of 100,000.

The moment a congressman is elected, Beattie writes, “he is concentrated on the campaign to get re-elected.” That is the number one goal: get re-elected, while looking over his shoulder at possible rivals.

Beattie tells the tale of former Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who was anti-Israel. In his next election bid AIPAC put up so much money against him that it became the most expensive Senate race ever. Helms won, but after that he became pro-Israel.

AIPAC does not win every time. An affiliated PAC (political action committee) tried and failed to oust now retired Rep. Jim Moran (D-VA).

AIPAC is overwhelmingly the largest pro-Israel force in the Congress. It takes a stand on everything and sees nearly every member of Congress as frequently as every three weeks.

But there is some room for hope. For example, congresspersons’ “loyalty” to AIPAC is paper thin. A considerable number of Jewish staffers, particularly the young, are uneasy about some of Israel’s policies.

Beattie writes with approval of former Congressman David Obey of Wisconsin, not identified as a “water carrier” for Israel. He tells of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who, according to Beattie, told Obey: “I just ask you to do two things. Please do not let Israel’s well-meaning friends in the United States prevent you [Obey] from continuing good relations with the Palestinians. Otherwise all will be lost. And try to keep AIPAC off my back. I’m a big boy now and I can do this [what needs to be done] by myself.” The story illustrates Rabin’s impression of AIPAC and how it sought to derail the Oslo peace process.

Obey did not toe the AIPAC line and claimed (to Beattie) that money was not decisive. Yet when questioned, he maintained that his high position and the myriad battles he had to fight supported his case. Perhaps, Beattie, says, Obey was unaware of just how much money he was getting from pro-Israel PACs. But Obey still “dialed” for pro-Israel dollars.

In The Israel Lobby (also available from Middle East Books and More), John Mearsheimer and Walt give an overall view of a pro-Israel Congress, while Beattie examines it minutely. Both are disillusioning. 

Andrew I. Killgore, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar, is publisher of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.